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McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 Andre Petras appeals the District Court’s dismissal of 
his reverse False Claims Act suit against his former employer, 
Simparel, Inc.; David Roth, Simparel’s founder and Chief 
Technology Officer; and Ron Grilli, Simparel’s Chief 
Executive Officer (collectively, “the Simparel defendants”).2    
Petras initially alleged a reverse FCA claim3 and 
retaliation claim4 under the False Claims Act against the 
Simparel defendants, as well as a conspiracy claim5 against 
all of the defendants.  The District Court dismissed the 
reverse FCA claim without prejudice, but the remaining 
conspiracy and retaliation claims were dismissed with 
prejudice.  Petras reasserted the reverse FCA claim against 
the Simparel defendants in a Second Amended Complaint, 
which the District Court again dismissed.   
                                                 
2 In his First Amended Complaint, Petras also sued Log 
Logistics, another company Roth founded; and MontERP 
Enterprises, f/k/a Ron Cacchione LLC, a Canadian consulting 
company.   
3 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G).  
4 Id. § 3730(h).   
5 Id. § 3729(a)(1)(C). 
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On appeal, Petras challenges the District Court’s 
dismissal of both Complaints.  For the reasons that follow, we 
will affirm.    
I. 
 
A. Background 
 
 Simparel sells proprietary software to apparel 
manufacturing companies.  Simparel’s original investor was 
L Capital, a venture capital firm licensed by the Small 
Business Administration, a federal agency.  The SBA 
provided over $90 million to L Capital through the purchase 
of certain securities, over $4 million of which was invested in 
Simparel.  In return, L Capital received preferred shares of 
Simparel representing 50.1% of that entity.  That amount was 
later reduced to 37.88% after the firm sold some shares.  
  
The Amended and Restated Certificate of 
Incorporation (“the Certificate”) specified two conditions that 
would require Simparel to pay preferred shareholders, such as 
L Capital, accrued dividends.  The Certificate provided for 
such payments if Simparel’s Board exercised its discretion to 
pay the dividends or if Simparel underwent an involuntary or 
voluntary liquidation, dissolution, or windup.   
 
From 2007 to 2012, Petras was Simparel’s Chief 
Financial Officer, David Roth was CTO, and Ron Grilli was 
its CEO.  The SBA was appointed as receiver of L Capital in 
2012 after Simparel failed to comply with its SBA funding 
agreement.  Petras contends that this failure resulted in the 
SBA becoming a preferred shareholder in Simparel, thus 
triggering the Certificate’s provisions and entitling the SBA 
to accrued dividends as a direct shareholder.  
 Petras does not allege that the Simparel Board ever 
declared that dividends would be paid, or that Simparel 
underwent liquidation, dissolution, or windup.  He instead 
claims that the Simparel defendants engaged in certain 
fraudulent conduct—to which he objected—in order to avoid 
paying the SBA these contingent dividends.  For example, he 
contends that the Simparel defendants engaged in tactics such 
as hiding Simparel’s deteriorating financial condition from 
the SBA, failing to hold board meetings to review quarterly 
results, and neglecting to send Simparel’s financial statements 
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to the SBA, as well as other tactics.  According to Petras, the 
Simparel defendants did this to prevent the SBA from placing 
Simparel into involuntary liquidation, which would have 
triggered the accrued dividends payment.  Petras also alleged 
that the Simparel defendants avoided dividend payments by 
diverting customers and technology from Simparel to Log 
Logistics, which is a company Roth had formed, and 
MontERP, a Canadian consulting company formed to provide 
computer programming services to aid Simparel’s software 
development.   
 
After Petras was terminated from employment with 
Simparel, he filed this suit under the FCA in District Court.   
 
B. The District Court’s Dismissal Orders 
 
Generally, an FCA action under 31 U.S.C. § 
3729(a)(1) targets fraudulent efforts to obtain money from the 
United States Government.6  A “reverse” FCA suit under § 
3729(a)(1)(G), however, arises from fraudulent efforts to 
reduce or avoid an obligation to pay the Government.7  More 
specifically, § 3729(a)(1)(G) imposes liability on anyone who 
“knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or 
decreases an obligation to pay . . . money . . . to the 
Government.”   
 
                                                 
6 See Hutchins v. Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, 253 F.3d 176, 
182 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that a plaintiff must show that: 
“(1) the defendant presented or caused to be presented to an 
agent of the United States a claim for payment; (2) the claim 
was false or fraudulent; and (3) the defendant knew the claim 
was false or fraudulent”); United States ex rel. Customs 
Fraud Investigations, LLC. v. Victaulic Co., 839 F.3d 242, 
247 (3d Cir. 2016) (observing that FCA actions “[t]ypically . . 
. allege that a person or company submitted a bill to the 
government for work that was not performed or was 
performed improperly, resulting in an undeserved payment 
flowing to that person or company”).  
7 See United States ex rel. Atkinson v. Pa. Shipbuilding Co., 
473 F.3d 506, 514 n.12 (3d Cir. 2007) (explaining that a 
reverse FCA claim is “centered around an alleged fraudulent 
effort to reduce a liability owed to the government rather than 
to get a false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid”).  
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The District Court first dismissed with prejudice all of 
the claims against the Simparel defendants and former 
defendants (Log Logistics and MontERP) except for the 
reverse FCA claim, which the District Court dismissed 
without prejudice.  The court held that Petras had not 
adequately pled that the Simparel defendants had an 
obligation to pay money to the Government because the 
“obligations” Petras identified in his First Amended 
Complaint were “outside the scope of the FCA’s definition of 
an obligation.”8  The dismissal of those substantive claims 
resulted in dismissal of Petras’s conspiracy claim.  The 
District Court also dismissed the retaliation claim, concluding 
that Petras could not establish the required causal nexus 
between the alleged retaliatory conduct and his FCA claim 
because he had not pled that the defendants knew of his claim 
or the related conduct.9  
 
Petras responded by filing a Second Amended 
Complaint in which he reasserted a reverse FCA claim 
against the Simparel defendants and attempted to support it 
with additional allegations.10  The attempt was unsuccessful, 
as the District Court again dismissed the FCA claim against 
the Simparel defendants.  The District Court concluded that 
the alleged obligation to pay the Government that was the 
                                                 
8 J.A., 0024. 
9 The District Court also declined to find that Roth or Grilli 
were “de facto employers” of Petras to hold them liable for 
Petras’s retaliation claim.  J.A., 0031. 
  
In dismissing the claims against former defendants 
Log Logistics and MontERP, the District Court first observed 
that Petras withdrew his reverse FCA claim against the two 
parties and accordingly dismissed that claim.  The District 
Court determined that with no underlying FCA claim, 
Petras’s conspiracy claim could not stand.  It also separately 
concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction over MontERP 
anyway.  Moreover, Petras’s conspiracy claim, according to 
the District Court, did not meet Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)’s 
pleading requirements.     
10 In his Second Amended Complaint, Petras did not reassert 
claims against Log Logistics and MontERP.  
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basis of the FCA claim was too “speculative” to give rise to 
an obligation under the FCA.11    
 
Petras now appeals the District Court’s dismissal of 
both his First Amended Complaint and his Second Amended 
Complaint.12   
II. 
 
A. Legal Standards 
 
Our review of the District Court’s dismissal is 
plenary.13  We have previously explained that a private 
individual, known as a “relator,” may bring a civil action in 
the name of the United States to enforce the FCA.14  
Nevertheless, a relator’s action survives a motion to dismiss 
                                                 
11 J.A., 0049 –50.  The District Court specifically rejected 
Petras’s three central allegations as to how Appellees 
prevented the dividend payout. The District Court, for 
example, noted that Petras had not alleged that Simparel was 
unable to pay the full value of accrued dividends if they ever 
came due, or that had the shareholders known the information 
about which he speculated, they would have dissolved 
Simparel.  It also observed that the shareholders had not 
sought dissolution even after Petras’s allegations came to 
light by way of this lawsuit.  Finally, the District Court cited 
the lack of factual allegations to support a conclusion that had 
the Board meetings occurred, dividends would have been 
declared.  The District Court therefore concluded that Petras 
did not state a claim under the FCA. 
12 Petras does not appeal the dismissal of his retaliation 
claims as against Roth and Grilli, individually, and we 
therefore do not consider them.  While Petras did not reassert 
claims against Log Logistics and MontERP in his Second 
Amended Complaint, he nonetheless now attempts to revive 
the conspiracy claim against Log Logistics and MontERP that 
he pled in his First Amended Complaint.   
13 Customs Fraud Investigations, F.3d 242 at 248 (“We 
review a District Court’s judgment of dismissal pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo.” (citing 
Bronowicz v. Allegheny Cnty., 804 F.3d 338, 344 (3d Cir. 
2015)).  
14 U.S. ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 
295, 305 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) & (d)).  
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under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
only if the factual allegations “raise a right to relief above the 
speculative level.”15  Thus, the complaint must state a 
“plausible claim for relief.”16   
 
Beyond this general standard, we have also explained 
that FCA claims in particular must be pled with particularity 
under Rule 9(b).17  Under Rule 9(b), “the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with 
particularity,”18 and a party must plead his claim with enough 
particularity to place defendants on notice of the “precise 
misconduct with which they are charged.”19    
 
With these standards in mind, we will proceed to 
evaluate the District Court’s dismissal of each of Petras’s 
claims.20   
 
B. Petras’s Reverse FCA Claim 
 
Petras’s reverse FCA claim alleges that the Simparel 
defendants knowingly and improperly avoided a contingent 
obligation to pay the accrued dividends to L Capital after L 
Capital had been placed into receivership and was being 
operated by the SBA.  On appeal, Petras argues that the 
District Court ignored the plain meaning of the FCA’s 
definition of “obligation” and that the court’s ruling 
contravenes Congress’s intent to broadly construe that term, 
                                                 
15 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).  
16 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).  
17 Customs Fraud Investigations, 839 F.3d at 258 (assessing 
the sufficiency of a reverse FCA claim using Fed. R. Civ. P. 
9(b)); United States ex rel. Schmidt v. Zimmer, Inc., 386 F.3d 
235, 242 n.9 (3d Cir. 2004).  
18 In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d 198, 
216 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)). 
19 Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 223–24 (3d Cir. 2004), 
abrogated in part on other grounds by Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
557.  
20 The District Court had jurisdiction over Petras’s FCA 
claims under 31 U.S.C. § 3732(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We 
have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s final order 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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as evidenced by recent amendments to the FCA.21  Petras also 
challenges the District Court’s finding that the obligation he 
alleged was too “speculative.”22  On that specific issue, 
according to Petras, the standard is not whether it is “possible 
that the triggering events for payment of accrued dividends 
may never occur,” but rather simply whether it is “plausible” 
under his Second Amended Complaint’s well-pleaded facts 
that the contingencies “could reasonably occur.”23 
  
We begin our analysis with the relevant statutory text.  
For Petras to assert a viable reverse FCA claim, he must show 
that the Simparel defendants “knowingly and improperly 
avoid[ed] or decrease[d] an obligation to pay or transmit 
money or property to the Government.”24  The Simparel 
defendants reiterate their argument on appeal that Petras’s 
reverse FCA claim fails because the SBA was not the 
“Government” when it was acting as the receiver for L 
Capital, a private entity.  The District Court did not address 
this issue.  However, since it is an issue of first impression 
before this court, we will take this opportunity to address it.  
  
We conclude that the SBA, when acting as a receiver 
under the circumstances here, was not acting as the 
Government.  In the absence of controlling precedent, we find 
the decisions of our sister circuit courts of appeal helpful.  In 
United States v. Beszborn, for example, the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit held that the Resolution Trust 
Corporation, an entity the Federal Government created to 
handle failed financial institutions’ affairs, was not a 
Government actor when operating as receiver of a failed 
bank.25  As receiver, the RTC sued the former officers and 
directors of the failed bank and obtained a judgment that 
included punitive penalties.26  When the Government later 
criminally charged the officers and directors for the same 
conduct, the Fifth Circuit rejected the defendants’ double 
jeopardy defense.27  The Fifth Circuit concluded that the 
                                                 
21 Appellant’s Br., at 28–29. 
22 Id. at 29. 
23 Id. 
24 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (emphasis added).  
25 21 F.3d 62, 68 (5th Cir. 1994).  
26 Id. at 67. 
27 Id. at 67–68. 
9 
 
RTC, as receiver, was not a Government entity because it had 
merely stood in the failed bank’s shoes.28   
 
More recently in United States ex rel. Adams v. Aurora 
Loan Servs., Inc., the  Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
applied a similar principle under the FCA.29   There, relators 
brought a traditional FCA suit against lenders and loan 
servicers, alleging that they had submitted false certifications 
to the mortgage entities, the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”), by selling loans to 
those companies.30  The relators argued that the false 
certifications to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac constituted 
“claims” under the FCA because they were requests for 
payment “‘presented to an officer, employee, or agent of the 
United States.’”31  The court rejected the relators’ argument, 
concluding that the mere fact of the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency’s conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
did not mean those companies had become “federal 
instrumentalities.”32  The Ninth Circuit explained that the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency, as conservator, assumed all 
of Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s rights, titles, powers, and 
privileges, “plac[ing] [the] FHFA in the shoes of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, and giv[ing] the FHFA their rights and 
duties, not the other way around.”33   
  
The same logic applies here.  As a general matter, 
when a federally chartered—but private—entity is placed into 
                                                 
28 Id. at 68.  See also Herron v. Fannie Mae, 857 F. Supp. 2d 
87, 94–95 (D.D.C. 2012) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim 
under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau 
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) against the Federal 
National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and 
emphasizing that it “was not converted into a government 
entity when it was placed into conservatorship; instead, [the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency] stepped into the shoes of 
Fannie Mae”).  
29 813 F.3d 1259, 1260 (9th Cir. 2016). 
30 Id.  
31 Id. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2)(A)(i)).  
32 Id. at 1260–61.  
33 Id. at 1261–62 (affirming the district court’s dismissal of 
the relators’ FCA claim).  
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receivership, the relevant federal agency, acting as receiver, 
“takes over the day-to-day operations and assumes the powers 
of shareholders, board of directors, and management.”34  In 
other words, the agency usually “steps into the private status 
of the entity” 35 and does not retain any federal authority.   
  
A governmental entity acting in its capacity as receiver 
thus does not necessarily qualify as the “Government” for 
purposes of the FCA.  Here, the SBA, as the receiver of L 
Capital, an indisputably private entity, assumed “all powers, 
authorities, rights and privileges heretofore possessed by the 
general partner, managers, officers, directors, investment 
advisors and other agents of L Capital.”36  The SBA did so 
“for the purpose of marshalling and liquidating in an orderly 
manner all of L Capital’s assets and satisfying the claims of 
creditors thereof in the order of priority as determined by 
[the] Court.”37  The SBA thus temporarily “stepped into” L 
Capital’s private shoes for the sole purpose of winding up the 
firm.  The authority for doing so was purely contractual in 
nature.  Accordingly, the SBA did not qualify as the 
Government for purposes of the FCA.   
  
We realize, of course, that the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
in Adams concerned the FDIC and a traditional FCA claim.  
However, that is a distinction without a difference. We see no 
reasoned basis for reaching a different result for the reverse 
FCA action before us.  Indeed, the SBA’s own internal 
operating procedures support the conclusion that the SBA 
was not acting as a governmental actor for purposes of 
Petras’s reverse FCA claim:  
 
                                                 
34 Herron, 857 F. Supp. at 93; see also, e.g., United States ex 
rel. Todd v. Fid. Nat’l Fin., Inc., No. 1:12-CV-666-REB-
CBS, 2014 WL 4636394, at *9 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2014). 
35 Herron, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 94; see also O’Melveny & 
Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 86 (1994) (“[T]he FDIC as 
receiver ‘steps into the shoes’ of the failed [financial 
institution].”); Beszborn, 21 F.3d at 68 (“The RTC as receiver 
of an insolvent financial institution stands in the shoes of the 
bank assuming all debts of the bank.”). 
36 J.A. 0210.  
37 J.A. 0209.   
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After SBA is appointed as Receiver (SBA-
Receiver), SBA is a fiduciary, responsible to the 
court and to all creditors, including SBA-
Creditor, and parties in the interest of the proper 
operation and/or liquidation of the debtor. The 
Receiver is a separate legal entity and, as such, 
its funds, records, claims, assets, and liabilities 
are not the funds, records, claims, assets, and 
liabilities of SBA or the Government. SBA-
Receiver’s decisions must be made for the 
benefit of the entire Receivership estate.38 
 
Accordingly, Petras’s reverse FCA claim must fail at the 
outset.39     
 
Moreover, even if the SBA could qualify as the 
Government, Petras’s reverse FCA claim would nevertheless 
fail for the reasons set forth by the District Court.  
 
The FCA defines “obligation” as “an established duty, 
whether or not fixed, arising from an express or implied 
contractual, grantor-grantee, or licensor-licensee relationship, 
from a fee-based or similar relationship, from statute or 
                                                 
38 SBA, SBIC Liquidation SOP 10 07 1, at 52, 
available at 
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/sops/serv_tool
s_sops_1007_1_0.pdf (first and third emphases in 
original and remaining emphases added).   
39 Despite Petras’s suggestion, our conclusion does not 
conflict with dicta we provided in Hutchins, 253 F.3d at 176.  
In Hutchins, a paralegal notified the United States Trustee 
that his law firm employer was submitting fraudulent billing 
statements to the United States Bankruptcy Court for payment 
from the U.S. Treasury.  As Petras notes, we stated in 
Hutchins—with no additional analysis—that it was 
“undisputed that the United States Trustee and the United 
States Bankruptcy Courts are government agents for purposes 
of the False Claims Act.”  Id. at 182.  The U.S. Trustee and 
U.S. Bankruptcy Courts were not implicated as receivers in 
that case, and neither party otherwise challenged whether 
those entities were governmental actors.  Thus, this Court’s 
statement in Hutchins regarding those entities is of little 
guidance on the specific issues here.     
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regulation, or from the retention of any overpayment.”40  
Petras argues that the Simparel defendants’ obligation to pay 
accrued dividends, while contingent on either the Board’s 
declaration of dividends or the company’s liquidation, 
nonetheless satisfies the FCA’s definition of an “obligation.”  
To support his argument that this FCA definition includes 
contingent obligations, Petras asks us to focus on “an 
established duty, whether or not fixed.”41  According to 
Petras, such qualifying language demonstrates that the term, 
“obligation,” includes instances in which a legal duty did not 
exist at the time of the FCA-prohibited conduct.   
 
The FCA provision does not define “established duty;” 
nor does it explain the meaning of the phrase, “whether or not 
fixed.”  Given the statute’s ambiguity, we will address the 
parties’ arguments regarding legislative history.42   
 
 That legislative history confirms the District Court’s 
conclusion that the contingent nature of the “obligations” at 
issue here precludes a finding that they are sufficiently 
definite to be included within the provisions of the FCA.  The 
current definition of “obligation” for reverse FCA claims 
resulted from the 2009 amendments to the FCA that were part 
of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 
(“FERA”).43  The FERA Senate Report states that the new 
definition of “obligation” was intended to address “confusion 
among courts that have developed conflicting definitions.”44  
The legislative history, as discussed below, reveals that an 
“established duty” more likely refers to one owed at the time 
that the alleged improper conduct under the FCA occurred.  
Contrary to Petras’s argument, the term does not include a 
duty that is dependent on a future discretionary act. 
 
 As originally proposed by United States Senators 
Leahy and Grassley, the FCA provision defined obligation as 
                                                 
40 § 3729(b)(3).  
41 Id.  
42 See United States v. Kouevi, 698 F.3d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 
2012) (“Legislative history is only an appropriate aid to 
statutory interpretation when the disputed statute is 
ambiguous.”).   
43 Pub. L. No. 111–21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009). 
44 S. Rep. 111-10, at 14 (2009). 
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“a fixed duty, or a contingent duty arising from an express or 
implied contractual . . . or similar relationship.”45  Senator 
Kyl suggested revising the definitional language, “a fixed 
duty, or a contingent duty,” to instead state: “an established 
duty, whether or not fixed.”46  Senator Kyl was concerned 
that under the original language Senators Leahy and Grassley 
had proposed, relators would feel emboldened to sue to 
enforce fines before the Government had “formally 
established” the duty to pay them.47  For example, if a 
corporation had falsely claimed compliance with a regulation, 
a relator could then bring a reverse FCA suit based on this 
conduct and assert that the corporation was improperly 
avoiding an obligation to pay discretionary fines that the 
Government might levy for this conduct.  Senator Kyl 
proposed his revision to prevent relators from bringing such 
speculative FCA claims, and his proposal for the alternative 
language was ultimately adopted.   
 
 Again, although the factual circumstances here are 
different, the difference is without a distinction.  The same 
basic principle animating Senator Kyl’s concern applies.  
Petras should not be able bring a reverse FCA claim alleging 
that the Simparel defendants improperly avoided an 
obligation to pay the Government because the obligation did 
not exist when the defendants’ alleged misconduct occurred.  
Even if we assume Petras’s allegations that the Simparel 
defendants withheld financial information from the SBA and 
diverted resources to other entities are true, the allegations do 
not make out an FCA claim under the circumstances here.  
The two events that would trigger an actual obligation to pay 
dividends—either the Board’s declaration of the dividends or 
Simparel’s liquidation—had not yet materialized, and Petras 
does not allege that they had or that he even knew when they 
would have materialized.  Indeed, the obligation technically 
would never materialize if the Board never exercised its 
discretion to declare the dividends or if Simparel never 
liquidated.  
 
                                                 
45155 Cong. Rec. S. 4539 (2009) (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2009) 
(statement of Sen. Kyl).   
46 Id.  
47 Id.  
14 
 
 Moreover, the legislative history of the statute’s other 
relevant language—“whether or not fixed”—suggests a 
reference to “whether or not the amount owed” was fixed at 
the time of the violation, not “whether an obligation to pay 
was fixed.”48  In discussing the meaning of “obligation,” the 
Senate Judiciary Report explained that an “obligation arises 
across the spectrum of possibilities from the fixed amount 
debt obligation . . . to the instance where there is a 
relationship between the Government and a person that 
results in a duty to pay the Government money, whether or 
not the amount owed is yet fixed.”49  This understanding of 
the phrase conflicts with Petras’s argument that the “whether-
or-not-fixed” phrase refers to the contingent obligation in this 
case—that is, the obligation to pay accrued dividends that 
arises when the Board declares dividends, or if Simparel is 
liquidated. 
 
 We conclude then that for a reverse FCA claim, the 
definition of an “obligation” refers to one existing at the time 
of the improper conduct to pay the Government funds, the 
amount of which may not be fixed at the time of the improper 
conduct.50  Our rationale accords with other appellate courts’ 
similar conclusions in other contexts.51      
                                                 
48 See United States ex rel. Boise v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 08-
287, 2015 WL 4461793, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 2015) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 1 John T. Boese, 
Civil False Claims and Qui Tam Actions § 2.01[L], 2–83 
(2014)).  
49 S. Rep. No. 111-10, at 14 (2009) (emphases added) 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
50 In our recent consideration of whether a failure to pay 
marking duties on imported products could give rise to a 
reverse FCA claim, we consulted the history of the 2009 
FERA amendments and observed that the amendments’ new 
definition of obligation “favor[ed] a more broadly inclusive 
definition” of the FCA’s reverse-false claim provision.  See 
Customs Fraud Investigations, 839 F.3d at 254.  In that case, 
the plaintiff had alleged that the defendant company, 
Victaulic, neglected to notify the United States Bureau of 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) of its pipe fittings’ 
non-conforming status. This failure to notify resulted in the 
pipe fittings being released into the stream of commerce in 
the United States and, consequently, owed marking duties not 
15 
 
                                                                                                             
being paid.  Id. at 254–55.  The district court concluded that 
Victaulic’s conduct was not grounds for false claims liability 
because such duties “were too attenuated and contingent to 
qualify as the types of obligations to pay money to the 
government covered by the FCA.”  Id. at 248.  We rejected 
the district court’s rationale.  We explained that because the 
duty accrued at the time of importation, “without 
exception,”—which the plaintiff alleges Victaulic knew—all 
the plaintiff had to prove to hold Victaulic liable under the 
FCA was that Victaulic knew of its obligation under federal 
law to properly mark its goods (or otherwise notify the CBP) 
and that Victaulic failed to do so before its goods cleared 
customs.  Id. at 254–55 (observing that the 2009 United 
States Senate Report “discussed customs duties for 
mismarking country of origin, and how such duties would be 
covered by the amended reverse false claims provision” 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).   
  
Here, by contrast, the District Court’s concern about 
the accrued dividends being too “speculative” to implicate 
FCA liability is justified.  For one, Petras has not alleged 
either of the two conditions under which the Simparel 
defendants’ obligations would have arisen.  Petras never 
alleges that the Board declared the dividends or had an 
inclination to do so; nor had Simparel entered into 
liquidation, and Petras does not allege as much.  The District 
Court did not, as Petras suggests, conflate the terms 
“contingent” and “speculative.”  Instead, the District Court 
properly concluded that regardless of the proper definition of 
“contingent,” the scenarios Petras advanced were so 
speculative that they could not be considered a contingent 
obligation. J.A., 0047.  We agree with that conclusion.   
51 In United States ex rel. Simoneaux v. E.I. duPont de 
Nemours & Co., for example, a relator sued his former 
employer under a reverse FCA action, alleging that his 
employer had failed to report chemical leaks to the EPA, as 
the Toxic Substances Control Act requires.  843 F.3d 1033, 
1034 (5th Cir. 2016).  The plaintiff claimed that the 
employer’s failure to do so allowed it to avoid government 
penalties, which, under the TSCA, the EPA has the discretion 
to assess.  Id. at 1040.  The plaintiff argued that after the 2009 
FCA amendments, the definition of “obligation” covered 
“contingent” penalties.  But the Fifth Circuit clarified that the 
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 In sum, under the FCA provision’s plain language, the 
Simparel defendants could not have “knowingly and 
improperly avoid[ed] or decrease[d] an obligation”52 to pay 
the accrued dividends at the time of their alleged misconduct 
because the obligation did not yet exist.  Accordingly, even if 
the SBA qualified as the Government for purposes of Petras’s 
FCA action, we would still affirm the District Court’s 
dismissal of Petras’s reverse FCA claim.   
 
C. Petras’s Conspiracy and Retaliation Claims 
 
Petras’s remaining claims are (1) that Log Logistics, 
MontERP, and the Simparel defendants all conspired to 
violate the reverse FCA provision; and (2) that the Simparel 
defendants unlawfully retaliated against him by terminating 
him after they became aware that he might file a FCA suit.  
Our explanation of why the District Court was correct in 
dismissing the FCA claim applies with equal force to the 
dismissal of Petras’s conspiracy claim.53   
The District Court dismissed Petras’s FCA retaliation 
claim because Petras had failed to sufficiently plead that the 
Simparel defendants knew that he would file an FCA claim 
before they terminated him.  In order to properly plead a FCA 
retaliation cause of action, Petras needed to show that “(1) he 
engaged in ‘protected conduct,’ (i.e., acts done in furtherance 
of an action under [31 U.S.C.] § 3730) and (2) that he was 
discriminated against because of his ‘protected conduct.’”54  
Petras also was required to show that the Simparel defendants 
were “on notice of the ‘distinct possibility’ of False Claims 
Act litigation and retaliated against him because of his 
‘protected conduct.’”55  Petras claims that the District Court 
erroneously concluded that he had not made clear that he had 
                                                                                                             
“new definition resolved uncertainty regarding whether the 
amount of an obligation needs to be fixed” and “did not upset 
the widely accepted holding that contingent penalties are not 
obligations.”  Id. at 1036. 
52 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G). 
53 See Pencheng Si v. Laogai Research Found., 71 F. Supp. 
3d 73, 89 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[T]here can be no liability for 
conspiracy where there is no underlying violation of the 
FCA.”). 
54 Hutchins, 253 F.3d at 186.   
55 Id. at 191.  
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alerted the Simparel defendants of his intention to file an 
FCA action.  
 
Even if Petras had sufficiently alleged such notice—an 
issue we do not address here—“the whistleblower protections 
apply only to actions taken in furtherance of a viable False 
Claims Act case,” though it need not be a “winning FCA 
case.”56  Here, for the reasons already explained, Petras’s 
reverse FCA action is not viable.  Therefore, Petras’s 
retaliation claim fails as well.  
 
III. 
 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
District Court’s dismissal of Petras’s complaint. 
 
                                                 
56 Dookeran v. Mercy Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 281 F.3d 105, 
107–08 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that “courts . . . require 
that there at least be a distinct possibility that a viable FCA 
action could be filed . . . . If there is no way that [a plaintiff’s] 
conduct of informing [his employer] about the allegedly 
fraudulent application could reasonably lead to a viable FCA 
action, then the whistleblower provision provides him no 
protection.”); see also Hutchins, 253 F.3d at 188. 
